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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of mobile telephony in the early fifties in Europe, US and Japan, the 
demand for this service exploded. Actually there are countries that have a market 
penetration of more than 100 per cent. This dramatic growth in the mobile 
telecommunications industry can be, at least partly, attributed to the growing trend toward 
privatization (defined as the sale of total or partial previously state-owned enterprises to 
private owners), market liberalization and deregulation. 
In Europe, while most national markets were monopolies in the late 1980s, by today, most of 
them have three or more competing mobile networks. The telecommunications reforms 
reflect changes in technology that might mitigate the reliance on government interventions 
and affect our understanding of the effects of these interventions. Many several studies have 
shown the impacts of telecommunications reforms on the market outcome and firms’ 
performance. On the one hand, privatization is said to increase the incumbent’s operational 
efficiency by reducing political control; on the other hand, it may very well deter market 
competition since the incumbent is able to engage in anti-competitive behaviors. The public 
incumbent, instead, due to political oversight may suffer from inefficient operation in 
competing with the rivals. Many studies point out that the privatization will produce the 
greatest efficiency gains where competition replaces monopoly. When both private and 
public firms are exposed to the same competitive pressures and market signals, they are 
expected to yield similar performance in terms of allocative efficiency, regardless of their 
ownership structure. 
The introduction of competition, breaking up or unbundling monopolies, and the 
privatization of state-owned telecommunications operators have become the main themes of 
telecommunications sector reform in developing and developed countries. These reforms 
might result in a falling of telecommunication prices, a significant expansion of 
telecommunications networks and a substantial improvement in productivity. This study 
attempts to uncover evidence on these effects. Several recent econometric studies have 
examined the effect of telecommunications reform on sector performance, especially for 
European countries. The majority of these studies consider that competition on its own, and 
complementarities between competition and privatization, are positively correlated with 
telecommunications industry performance.  
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Although there has been much empirical research on the effects of privatization, 
competition and regulation on the telecommunications sector, very little empirical work was 
interested in studying these effects on mobile telecommunication sector. This chapter 
studies the effects of telecommunication reforms (privatization, competition and regulation) 
on mobile operator’s performance in the OCDE area. 
2. The dilemma of privatization 
Many economists, policy makers and corporate managers have long believed that private 
firms are more efficient than public ones. Privatization, defined as the sale of (total or 
partial) previously state-owned enterprises to private owners, is, so, assumed to increase the 
firm’s efficiency and profitability because, on the one hand, the change in ownership 
structure shifts the privatized firm’s objectives and the managers’ incentives away from 
those imposed by politicians. The managers are then subordinate to them on monitoring 
and discipline of profit oriented investors. On the other hand, privatization may very well 
deter market competition since the incumbent is able to engage in anti-competitive 
behaviors. The public incumbent, instead, due to political oversight may suffer from 
inefficient operation in competing with the rivals. 
As a result, since the late of 1980s, several countries have undergone partial or full 
privatization of their utility sectors, especially telecommunications.  In fact, until recently, in 
most countries, telecommunications service providers were state owned, state operated, and 
often monopolistic. The telecommunications sector was viewed as the quintessential public 
utility. Economies of scale, combined with political sensitivity, created large entry barriers 
and externalities. Since the 1980s, policy makers gradually began to recognize that 
telecommunications systems are an essential infrastructure for economic development. As 
the economy broadens and becomes critically dependent on vastly expanded flows of 
information, telecommunications acquires strategic importance for economic growth and 
development. Besides, rapid technological innovations in the past three decades have 
significantly reduced economies of scale and scope in this sector, attenuating the economic 
rationale for a state-owned natural monopoly in the Telecommunications sector. The 
solution was privatization which aims to break the monopoly and improve the efficiency 
and performance of the telecommunication industry. 
Theoretically, privatization affects the firm’s performance through multiple channels. It 
might cause firms to operate more productively because managers are subjected to the 
pressures of the financial markets and to the monitoring and discipline of profit-oriented 
investors. In addition, the change in ownership structure of privatized firms shifts the firm’s 
objectives and managers’ incentives away from those that are imposed on them by 
politicians, toward those that aim to maximize efficiency, profitability, and shareholders’ 
wealth. By going public, firms would have many entrepreneurial opportunities because they 
would not be subject to government control (D’Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2007). 
Furthermore, Hartley and Parker (1991) developed a conceptual framework based on 
property rights and public choice approaches, in order to show that privatized firms are 
more efficient than SOEs because profit motivation is absent for public firms. This is why 
many authors found that privatization leads to significant improvements in the availability 
and quality of telecommunications services. In fact, privatization leads to network 
expansion and modernization of Telecommunications services. 
In contrast to the aforementioned literature, which concludes that ownership does matter 
under competitive environments, other researchers pay more attention to the role of 
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competition rather than ownership per se. The reduction in government ownership is not, in 
fact, the only factor that improves the performance of privatized firms. The competitive 
environment and capital-market discipline also increase the efficiency of these firms (Castro 
& Uhlenbruck, 1997). In this context, policy makers suggest that competition can greatly 
improve monitoring possibilities and hence increase incentives for production efficiency. 
Thus, it follows that private firms are more efficient than SOEs in competitive environments. 
However, in noncompetitive industries or in industries with natural monopoly elements, 
the performance of privatized firms is ambiguous, and results from empirical studies are 
inconclusive (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998). Vining and Boardman (1992) argue that at low 
levels of competition, the differences between public and private ownership would be 
insignificant, as both types of firms would adopt similar rent seeking behavior. When 
competition increases, however, private ownership offers incentives and motivation for 
managers to proactively adopt profit-maximizing behavior. In addition, D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999) indicate that privatized firms that work in competitive industries are 
likely to yield solid and rapid economic benefits as long as there are no economy wide 
distortions that hinder competition. Parker and Hartley (1991) point out privatization will 
produce the greatest efficiency gains where competition replaces monopoly. 
When both private and public firms are exposed to the same competitive pressures and 
market signals, they are expected to yield similar performance in terms of allocative 
efficiency, regardless of their ownership structure (Fare, Grosskopf, & Logan, 1985). In the 
same vein, Forsyth (1984, p. 61) states, ‘‘Selling a government firm makes no difference to 
the competitive environment in which it operates; ownership and competitive structure are 
separate issues.’’ Newbery (1999) proposed that the emphasis should be placed on breaking 
up monopolies before privatization. Omran (2004) further indicates that, due to spillover 
and learning effects, the performance of state owned enterprises does not depart 
significantly from that of their privatized counterparts once they anticipate later 
privatization and competition in the sector.  
It appears that the importance of establishing an institutional framework, i.e., regulation and 
competition, before privatizing firms has been emphasized. So, the sequence of the 
telecommunication reform might affect the outcome of market competition, that is, the time 
and extent to which the incumbent monopoly is shattered. When privatization comes before 
competition, a monopoly can attract foreign investment more easily, leading to successful 
privatization, because the returns from investment are guaranteed by the100% market share. 
In this sense, the state as an owner is tempted to delay competition in exchange for the 
higher capitalization value of the firm during privatization (Bauer, 2003, p.12). Even if 
competition is allowed in a later period of time, the firm is still able to consolidate its market 
share since it possesses the network effects inherent in its large net work and is more likely 
to engage in anti-competitive behaviors in this asymmetric market (Rey&Tirole, 2007). On 
the other hand, the cost for the competitive rivals to challenge the established incumbent, 
such as interconnection charges and negotiation costs, is so formidable that they have 
difficulty becoming significant market players.  
Seen otherwise, many papers1 suggest that privatization without a simultaneous 
introduction of competition will simply create private monopolies. Most economists 
therefore argue that privatization works better when there is competition that limits the 
                                                                 
1 See for example George Yarrow, Privatization in Theory and Practice, Econ. Policy 324 (1986); J. A. Kay 
& D. J. Thompson, Privatization: A Policy in Search of a Rationale, 96 Econ. J. 18 (1986); Vickers & 
Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (1995); World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business (1995) 
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market power of the incumbent(s). The paper of Chorng-Jian Liu and al. (2009) does 
highlight a dilemma in telecommunication reforms, in that a not-yet-privatized incumbent 
under market competition can no longer dominate the market but is turned into an 
inefficient operation. Authors call for a rethinking of telecommunications development 
theory that overlooks the importance of the sequencing between privatization and 
liberalization. Indeed, the timing of privatization affects the speed and the degree to which a 
monopolistic market is transformed into a competitive one. Competition and privatization 
are thus seen as complementary. Besides, Product market competition is a potent force that 
improves performance in its own right. It tends to weed out inefficient firms, if they face 
hard budget constraints. The threat of bankruptcy may compel existing operators to be more 
efficient so as to minimize the probability of a corporate failure. Since state-owned firms 
rarely operate under hard budget constraints, the positive impact of market competition on 
performance is more likely to be present in privatized firms, further suggesting a 
complementarity between privatization and competition. 
As a conclusion, the dilemma of privatization set a particular attention on how the degree of 
privatization and competition affects performance and how components of the policies 
interact with each other in shaping the reform outcomes. For instance, does full 
privatization improve the performance of a country’s telecommunications sector more than 
partial privatization? Is privatization (or competition) alone sufficient in improving 
economic performance, or are privatization and competition complementary policies? And 
finally, how do privatization and competition affect performance measures? 
Policy makers suggest that there is a strong presumption that privatization and competition 
in the telecommunications sector improve economic performance. Whether this 
presumption is true remains largely an empirical question. 
3. Corporate performance: Theory and evidence 
Privatization, seen as an important economic phenomenon, has attracted much attention 
from academic researchers and policy analysts. Studies document generally that moving 
companies from state to private ownership improves firm performance. However, majority 
of these studies show that privatization works better when it is accompanied by other major 
institutional and legal reforms. These two lessons represent important contributions to 
economic thought and help to support the emerging consensus among policy-makers about 
how best to use privatization as a tool for promoting economic development. 
Begin first with a definition of the performance concept. Based on research long-rooted in 
the management discipline, performance can be defined as the accomplishment of a given 
task measured against preset standards of accuracy, completeness, cost, and speed. Firm 
performance is measured against standard or prescribed indicators of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and environmental responsibility (Duty or obligation to satisfactorily perform 
or complete a task) such as, cycle time, productivity, regulatory compliance… etc. Efficiency 
means the comparison of what is actually produced or performed with what can be 
achieved with the same consumption of resources (money, time, labor, etc.). It is an 
important factor in determination of productivity. Effectiveness is relative to the degree to 
which objectives are achieved and the extent to which targeted problems are resolved. In 
contrast to efficiency, effectiveness is determined without reference to costs and, whereas 
efficiency means "doing the thing right," effectiveness means "doing the right thing." 
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During the last two decades important structural policies have taken place worldwide in the 
telecommunication sector. A significant number of studies attempt to assess the 
consequences of the aforementioned changes. Two types of analysis are usually encountered 
in the relevant literature: empirical econometric analyses and descriptive analyses. These 
research papers mainly examine the consequences of the telecommunication market reform 
and the corporate restructuring of traditional telecommunication organizations, which were 
fully or partly privatized through public offer or through direct sale to one or more 
investors. Studies on the privatization and performance of telecommunication industry 
started in the early 1980s. Many papers investigated the effects of privatization and 
competition on the expansion and performance of telecommunication network. 
Results from the study of Wallsten (2002) reveal the correlation between privatization, 
competition, regulation, and performances of telecommunication industry in 30 Latin 
American and African countries. Fink et al. (2002) examined the effects of national policy 
reform in the telecommunication sectors of 86 countries and found that both privatization 
and competition can lead to significant improvement in telecommunication performance.  
Few studies analyze the impact of public enterprise reform on profitability, productivity, 
exports, budgetary impacts, crowding out of the private sector, etc. Moreover, many of the 
studies also suffer from basic methodological deficiencies. For example, using cross-
sectional data, Foreman-Peck and Manning (1988) conducted total factor productivity 
analyses to compare the performance of British Telecom (BT), which was privatized in 1984, 
with the performance of five telecom firms in Europe. They concluded that British Telecom 
is apparently less efficient than the companies in Norway and Denmark, but more efficient 
than those in Spain and Italy. Their finding is inconclusive, however, since ownership is by 
state in Norway, but mixed in Denmark, Spain and Italy. This methodology is incapable of 
linking variations in performance with the change in the company’s ownership. 
Several sector specific studies have also been conducted on the outcome of reforming 
telecommunications services, albeit in developed economies (Takano, 1992; Oniki et al., 
1992; Imai, 1994; Foreman-Peck, 1991). The study of Foreman-Peck (1991) examined whether 
the transformation in the telecommunications sector altered or improved performance over 
that of the previous state regime. Results suggest a substantial improvement in the 
productivity performance of the telecommunications industry after privatization. Takano 
(1992) examined the process, as well as benefits and losses stemming from the partial 
privatization of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), a government 
monopoly producer of domestic telecommunications services in Japan. The study evaluated 
the benefits to four important actors: NTT proper, stockholders, users and government. 
Oniki et al. (1992) assessed the impact of deregulation on NTT through improved 
management and operations by estimating a translog variable cost function for 1983– 1989 
fiscal years. According to the study, deregulation resulted in a cost reduction of 1.31 or 
2.29%, depending on the specification of the cost function adopted. In the same vein, Imai 
(1994) estimated the cost reduction associated with the 1985 deregulation of international 
telephone services in Japan. The study estimated that NTT’s unit cost fell by a wide margin 
after deregulation (54.5%).  
Many studies in the telecommunications sector seek to explore the regulatory institutions of 
different countries using the new institutional economics. Levy and Spiller (1996) conducted 
a comparative analysis of the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory 
structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United 
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Kingdom, Chile, Argentina and the Philippines. The study examines the relationship 
between regulatory outcomes and performance, and how each country resolved its 
regulatory problems. 
Galal and Nauriyal (1995) explored the relationship among the outcomes of regulatory 
reforms, regulatory incentives and government commitment on the basis of the recent 
regulatory experience of seven developing countries: Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela. They attempt to link the performance of the telecom 
sector with the extent to which these countries successfully resolved the information 
asymmetry, pricing and contracting problems. Results show that the sector continues to 
suffer from under-investment and low productivity. Other countries had mixed results. 
The majority of these studies were interested on telecommunication firm performance 
without differentiating between mobile and fixed telephone activity. However, the reform of 
the sector has caused the rapid increase in the proportion of penetration of novel 
telecommunication services, most notably mobile telephony and the Internet (Clarke and 
Gebreab et al. 2003, Ypsilantis 2002, Xavier and Ypsilantis 2001). It is important to note that 
the proliferation of main telephone lines, which appears more intense during the initial 
years of the reform, is reduced after the full liberalisation of the market due to the intense 
American Economic Review 91, 320–334. 
Doove S., Gabbitas O., Nguyen-Hong D. and J. Owen, 2001. Price Effects of Regulation that 
develops in the mobile telephony market impacts positively on the levels of productivity 
(Fink and Mattoo et al 2003). Similarly, the increase in production, mostly expressed in 
terms of phone call flows, increases the productivity index. Moreover, the reduction in the 
number of employees in traditional telecommunications organizations promptly increases 
work productivity (Dia and Ν' Guessan et al 2002). Ypsilantis and Min (2001) as well as 
Sacripanti (1999) observe a greater reduction of prices in mobile telephony services due to 
the more intense competition in these markets. Ypsilantis and Min (2000) examine the 
percentage of successful calls and the proportion of access in order to examine the quality of 
mobile telephony services, and conclude that the reform is positively associated with the 
quality of services in mobile telephony. Nevertheless, in some cases, the quality of services 
on offer showed no indications of improvement, despite the reforms of the sector, thus 
remaining at the approximate level before the reform. Bernardo Bortolotti and al. (2002) use 
the number of licensed operators in the mobile (analogue and digital) telephony market as a 
proxy for product market competition in 25 national markets involved. They were interested 
in measuring the competitive pressure faced by the privatized companies, so they refer only 
to operators not owned by the incumbents.  
The paper of Chorng-Jian Liu and al. (2009) explores the factors that hamstrung Chunghwa 
Telecom in competition against its rival entrants. The econometric analysis substantiates the 
fact that handset subsidies are the most effective instrument for mobile firms to gain market 
share. Chunghwa Telecom, due to its public ownership status, was nevertheless prohibited 
at first from adopting such a marketing strategy. The empirical results pinpoint the 
importance of the sequencing of reforms in telecommunications: a prolonged privatization 
could help to promote competition in the industry. Public ownership makes Chunghwa 
Telecom vulnerable to political intervention and operational inefficiency, which is a 
barricade to performance and competitiveness for the not-yet-privatized company in a 
liberalized market. Taiwan’s case paves a shortcut to successful implementation of 
telecommunication reform in a timely fashion. 
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The paper of Zheng, S., & Ward, M.R., (2011) studies the effects of competition and 
privatization on Chinese telecommunications performance, using panel data. First, mobile 
service has become the dominant platform for service. Over the sample, mobile calling 
volume went from less than half to almost three times that of fixed service. Second, growing 
income levels contributed to this shift. Higher income is estimated to be associated with 
increased demand for mobile service and decreased demand for fixed service. Third, a 
significant portion of the mobile price reductions are due to greater within mobile platform 
competition. Fourth, there is some evidence that the movement toward private versus state 
ownership also contributed to this transition. Privatization is associated with lower mobile 
usage prices and higher usage levels. However, it is associated with higher fixed prices and 
reduced fixed demand. 
4. Reforms and special issues on the mobile communications sector 
4.1 Telecommunications policy reform 
Three dimensions of public policy reforms are relevant and have been applied in developing 
and developed countries: a change of ownership, an introduction of competition, and a 
strengthened regulation. 
1. The first telecommunication reform strategy implemented by states in renovating the 
sector is often to privatize the national telecommunications provider. By selling off a 
controlling interest in the national telephone company, political leaders hope to expose 
the organization to market pressures for efficiency and profit. However, privatization 
without a simultaneous introduction of competition will simply create private 
monopolies. Most economists therefore argue that privatization works best when there 
is competition that limits the market power of the incumbent(s). Competition is thus 
seen as a complement to privatization (Xu and Li, 2002). 
2. Hence, the second strategy is to break the provider’s domestic monopoly over the 
consumer services market. The objective of liberalization is to induce competition in 
prices, creating incentives to lower production cost and increasing product innovation 
(Nicoletti G. and Scarpetta S., 2003). Since the beginning of 1998 a number of European 
Union member countries opened their mobile telecommunication markets to full 
infrastructure and service competition by allowing competition for public voice 
infrastructures and services2. Despite this market openness, many governments 
maintain the two roles as industry regulator and players by holding shares or directly 
competing on the mobile market. This may, on the one hand, very well deter market 
competition since the incumbent is able to engage in anti-competitive behaviors. On the 
other hand, because of privatization, governments can no longer overtly affect company 
decisions. But they often appeal to the public interest in order to stay politically 
engaged via weak regulatory structures. As a result, regulation is considered as a form 
of state involvement (Latzer et al, 2006). 
3. Consequently, the third common reform is to insure the regulatory independence. This 
occurs when the regulatory body is separate from and not accountable to, any supplier 
of basic telecommunications services. Most OECD countries defined the 
“independence” of the regulator as a separation from day-to-day political interference, 
                                                                 
2 In addition to this opening of national telecommunication markets, was the agreement to liberalize 
international trade in basic telecommunications. 
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and independence of decision making based on powers vested in the regulatory body. 
However, for many years in many countries, the regulatory body is kept attached to the 
Ministry and the regulator is under the direct supervision of the executive of 
government. Hence, both scholars and international institutions advocate for the 
establishment of independent regulators, which means professionalizing the staff 
making decisions about telecommunications policy and appointing technocrats instead 
of political leaders to senior positions (Howard, Mazaheri, 2008). Some countries devote 
large resources to establish independent regulatory agencies, in compliance with the 
directives of the World Bank, the OCDE and the European Union.  
Since there is evidence that policy reforms may have an impact on operators’ performance, 
answering the questions above must involve assessing the effects of each of these three 
policy reforms on performance indicators.  
4.2 Special issues on the mobile communications sector 
Apart from the distribution of licenses3 (for GSM and/or UMTS) and related questions on 
infrastructure sharing, several topics regarding mobile telecommunications were or still 
problematic for National Regulator Agencies (NRAs) and the European Union: roaming, 
Mobile Number Portability (MNP), Mobile Termination rates (MTR), universal services 
access requirements and mobile Virtual  Network Operators. 
4.2.1 International roaming charges 
The first Regulation on international roaming services was published on 29 June 2007. The 
definitive text of Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union on 29 June 2009. Regulation on international roaming requires all 
operators in the EU to offer customers regulated voice and SMS retail roaming tariffs, 
which must comply with maximum price caps (known as the Eurotariff). The Regulation 
also provides that operators may offer alternative, i.e. unregulated, retail roaming tariffs 
alongside. Under the 2009 Regulation, the average wholesale roaming voice charge must 
be calculated on a per second basis, adjusted to take account of the possibility for the 
operator of the visited network to apply an initial minimum charging period not 
exceeding 30 seconds. This has led to a significantly lower surcharge in EU countries, 
from around 21% in Q2 2009 to around 6% in Q2 2010. Considering “Rest of World” retail 
voice roaming calls, typical prices are significantly greater than for calls wholly within 
EU/EEA. Overall, average Eurotariff retail voice roaming rates remained fairly near the 
regulated caps in many Member States. The Roaming Regulation does not seem to have 
had a significant impact on the pricing of other mobile services. Any waterbed effects 
would be expected to be small due to the fact that roaming revenue is a small part of 
overall mobile revenue (EU average of 4.2% in 2009). 
                                                                 
3 Government licensing policy in mobile telecommunications has various dimensions.  First, the 
government needs to decide whether to set a single national (or international) standard, or whether to 
allow multiple technological systems to compete.  Second, the government has to decide to how many 
firms will receive a license. This  also  involves  an  important  decision with  respect  to  the  timing  of  
first  and  additional  licenses.  Third, the government needs to decide how to grant licenses.  In the 
early days of mobile telecommunications, licenses were often granted on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
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4.2.2 Mobile number portability 
Mobile Number Portability (MNP) is a regulated facility which enables subscribers of 
mobile services to change their service provider whilst keeping their existing telephone 
number. Its purpose is to foster consumer choice and effective competition by enabling 
subscribers to switch between providers without the costs and inconvenience of changing 
telephone number. It is an important prerequisite for intensifying market competition4 since 
it lowers switching costs, churn rates should be expected to increase5. The EU’s Universal 
Service Directive requires member states to implement number portability for mobile 
services6. There are a number of countries where networks do not charge customers for 
porting numbers. For instance, in addition to Finland, MNP is typically free in the UK and 
in Ireland. In Belgium, only pre-paid subscribers pay for porting their mobile number. 
During the porting process, the ported number cannot handle incoming or outgoing calls.  
The speed of porting is also heterogeneous across countries. While in some countries 
porting time is extremely short—porting takes only two and a half hours in the US—
operators from other countries may need days, weeks or even months to port a number. 
More recently, Article 30(4) of the Citizens “Rights Directive” (2009) introduced a new 
requirement that consumers, “having concluded an agreement” shall have the number 
activated within one working day. The article also introduces a competence on Member 
States to impose sanctions on service providers, including a provision to compensate 
subscribers in case of delay in porting or abuse of porting by them or on their behalf. 
4.2.3 Mobile termination charges 
Call termination charges into mobile networks are currently one of the most crucial issues 
facing regulators in Europe. Call termination refers to the final completion of calls on a 
network, and in this case regards calls to mobile phones i.e. completion of calls in mobile 
networks which have originated in other fixed or mobile networks. A termination charge is 
a wholesale charge paid by the operator in whose network the call originates, to the 
operator of the network in which a call ends. The retail price paid by callers for a call from 
one network to a mobile network is broadly made up of two components: (a) the first 
operator's cost to originate and carry the call and (b) the termination charge paid by the first 
operator to the second terminating operator.  
New regulatory measures, imposed on mobile termination markets by the Regulatory 
Framework of 2002, induced a global decrease of mobile termination rates. According to the 
European Regulators Group (ERG), the average decrease of Mobile Termination Rates 
(MTR) levels between 2004 and 2007 is about 26%, with important disparities between 
countries. Besides, the European Commission increasingly invites NRAs to make 
termination rates asymmetries disappear and to specify, meanwhile, the convergence 
conditions towards termination rates symmetry, with regard to both target level and time 
frame. The Commission considers that asymmetry, which refers to differences between 
MTRs of MNOs within the same member state, requires an adequate justification. 
                                                                 
4 By today, almost in all European countries number portability is possible.   
5 Unfortunately, there are no statistics on churn rates available for most European countries. 
6 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands first implemented MNP in Europe in 1999. Countries such 
as pain (2000), Sweden and Denmark (all 2001), Belgium, Italy, Germany and Portugal (all 2002) 
followed suit. Most recently, Estonia implemented MNP due to regulatory intervention. 
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4.2.4 Universal services access requirements 
The Universal Service Directive (USD, Article 3), requires to ensure that universal services 
are made available at the quality specified to all end-users in their territory, independently 
of geographical location, in the light of specific national conditions and at an affordable 
price. Among services included in the scope of the universal service, we can identify: 
- Provision of access at a fixed location to the public telephone network; 
- Special measures for disabled end-users to ensure access to and affordability of publicly 
available telephone services, including access to emergency services. 
In addition to the services listed above, Member States may take the following measures: 
- Specific measures to ensure that disabled end-users can also take advantage of the 
choice of undertakings and service providers available to the majority of end-users;  
- provision of tariff options or packages to consumers which depart from those provided 
under normal commercial conditions (Article 9(2) USD) 
- Provision of specific facilities and services allowing subscribers to monitor and control 
expenditure and avoid unwarranted disconnection of service 
- Measures to cover different parts of the national territory. 
Looking at the European market, one can conclude that, in general, it is not yet possible to 
provide the universal service at any location. Only in the densely populated countries with a 
high coverage level of mobile network such a possibility exists. 
4.2.5 Mobile virtual network operators 
The Regulatory Framework enables the operations of virtual operators and creates them a 
business opportunity. If the incumbent operators are not willing to open their networks 
voluntarily, the regulations help the NRAs to enforce the network access with reasonable 
terms. These terms have to be equal to the vertically integrated service operators of MNOs. 
In accordance with Finnish Communications Market Act. Section 23, MNOs with SMP can 
be imposed obligations regarding access to the MNOs network when necessary. These 
obligations are to give service providers the right to access the MNOs network. 
In summary, the regulatory situation concerning different types of virtual operators is not 
yet harmonized between the EU countries.  
5. Evidence from European countries 
5.1 Data and variables analysis  
Our empirical work relies mainly on several primary sources. Firstly, the industry data 
comes from the ITU World Telecommunication Indicators (2010) dataset. Secondly, the 
policy indicators were gathered from several web sites such as OECD regulatory 
database, ITU World Telecommunications Regulatory database, Privatization Barometer 
database and POLCOIII dataset. Note that, all mobile data used concern GSM mobile 
business.  
We consider the mobile telecommunications markets in 31 European countries over the 
period 1993 to 2008, using network deployment (main mobile lines per 100 inhabitants), 
prices, output and quality as the dependant variables. We consider three main aspects of 
mobile telecommunications reform-privatization, competition and regulatory development-
as explanatory variables. The set of explanatory variables, other than measures of the 
regulatory reforms, also includes control variables such as technological progress, 
demographic, political and macroeconomic indicators. 
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5.1.1 Mobile communications performance indicators and measurement issues 
Traditionally, corporate performance at Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) tends to be 
evaluated by several Performance Measurement Indicators (PMIs) such as gross revenues, 
number of subscribers, ARPU, churn7, quality of services, profits, as well as market share. 
However, in this study, the precise definition of the performance measures was dictated by 
the availability of data and also due to well known measurement issues. This is discussed 
below in analyzing the quantification of each performance indicator chosen in this study for 
the mobile communications industry. 
5.1.1.1 Productivity 
Productivity of service industries and especially mobile communications is hard to define. 
Indeed, unlike manufactured goods, services are characterized by a greater degree of 
heterogeneity, which makes aggregation difficult. As mentioned below, mobile 
telecommunications output may include the number of users serviced, the number of 
minutes of communication supplied, the range and the quality of services provided as well 
as the (generally immeasurable) network externalities. In analyzing performance, many 
studies on telecommunications consider both labor productivity (LP) measured as revenues 
per employee per year, and total factor productivity8 (TFP) in order to assess productivity 
changes (Armando Calabrese and al., 2002).  Some research has found that privatization 
leads to lower prices through the expansion of the network or improved labor productivity 
(Ros 1999, Li and Xu 2002, Fink et al. 2003). However the effects of privatization and 
competition were complementary. Pagoulatos and Zahariadis (2011) found that labor 
productivity is negatively affected by state ownership. Indeed, the aim of regulation in 
telecommunications is to meet social goals, avoid potential abuses due to predatory 
behavior, and stimulate competitive pressures to enhance consumer welfare. Hence, labor 
productivity is expected to increase as companies become more efficient in their quest for 
higher profits under external regulatory constraints. Note that any increase in size of 
employment will have a negative effect on productivity growth. The decrease in the number 
of employees, reducing the denominator, enhances the labor productivity indicators. 
5.1.1.2 Employment 
Studies show that state-owned companies tend to over-staff workers, pay high wages, and 
provide generous benefits. Therefore, it is argued that the effects of reforms, namely 
privatization, in the telecommunication sector on employment are likely to be negative since 
privatization reduces overstaffing; (Li and Xu 2002, Ypsilantis and Min 2001, Xavier and 
Ypsilantis 2001). However, cases of little or insignificant employment reductions (or even 
employment increase) exist. The main explanation is that generally, overstaffing usually 
                                                                 
7 The wireless industry is at an inflection point; marked by saturation, competition, stagnant revenue 
growth and increasing customer care and subscriber acquisition costs. As such, the ability to retain an 
existing customer has become critical to recapturing some of the revenue and margin sacrificed by 
customer acquisition programs and price promotions. With such figures, churn data, alongside 
subscriber acquisition costs, has become a key measure used by industry analysts to determine mobile 
operator performance. 
8 Total factor productivity picks up productivity gains that cannot be attributed to increases in the 
productivity of labor or capital usage alone. This residual productivity is attributed to the combined 
effects rather than to other factors. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Recent Developments in Mobile Communications – A Multidisciplinary Approach 14
occurs in clerical and administrative positions and not in the more technically skilled jobs 
such as in the telecommunications sector9. Indeed, in countries that carried out labor 
reforms early in the process, there was a minimal effect on employment post-privatization. 
It is more likely that the studies reflect real differences in post-privatization employment 
changes between countries. However, the safest conclusion we can assert is that 
privatization does not automatically induce employment reductions in divested firms.  
5.1.1.3 Output 
One of the major obstacles in telecommunications comparisons is the measurement of 
output. Some studies measure output only in physical terms (for example, in the number of 
calls and access lines). Other studies weight physical output in terms of relative prices (for 
example, revenue or value of output per subscriber). Ariff, (2009), Nicoletti, (2000) and 
Pavlos C. Symeou, (2004) have defined the telecommunications output as the number of 
mobile subscribers, total revenue and outgoing telecom minutes. Heshmati and El-Rhinaoui 
(2009) uses as output the mobile traffic (minutes of use of all subscribers). Due to data 
constraints, a relatively narrow definition of output was adopted: the total revenue divided 
by the cost of a 3-minute local call on a mobile. In general, there is broad agreement that 
output increases more after reforms for telecom sector. However, results from different 
studies suggest that the effects of privatization are either complemented or overwhelmed by 
the effects of competition and/or regulation. Separating the effects is difficult, but the 
evidence suggests that privatization without strong regulatory support is less effective. 
5.1.1.4 Prices 
The weakest link in the data chain is on prices as these are notoriously difficult to know and 
to compare across economies. The MNOs offer increasingly complex and diversified 
products at lower and lower prices. Besides, changes in quality are reflected by 
improvements in physical and non-physical characteristics which induce several dimensions 
in the measurement issue (Karamti and Grzybowski, 2010). Furthermore, even though price 
differentials may reflect quality differences, most of the studies assume that the mobile 
service is provided at same quality by each mobile operator in the sample which makes the 
simple prices comparison irrelevant.  
The tariff baskets are commonly approved as the most appropriate method for price 
comparisons among countries. Cross-country differences in observed prices may also reflect 
differences in price regulation. To account for some of these problems, OECD tariff baskets 
were supplemented with a measure of “average prices” in the mobile services: mobile 
revenues per subscriber (ARPU). However, because limitations in using price data for 
mobile services identified by previous studies (i.e. Magnien, 2002; Banerjee and Ros, 2004a) 
we were constrained, as many other studies, to proxy the price with the average revenue per 
minute (Sung, 2007). 
5.1.1.5 Mobile density 
The teledensity refers to the number of mobile phone lines per 100 inhabitants in a country 
(Ariff, 2009; Xu and Li, 2004). Despite the fact that the mobile telephony development is 
usually measured by the number of cellular subscribers in a country (Boon Lee and William 
                                                                 
9 Note also that requirements of a digital system would spell technological unemployment for older 
workers while younger computer-trained staffs are being recruited (Ure, 2003). 
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Shepherd (2000)), Hamilton, 2003; Gutierrez and Berg, 2000), we prefer taking density 
(subscribers per 100 inhabitants) since it is considered a better indicator of the development 
of the traffic of mobile network. 
5.1.1.6 Quality 
Quality is a multi-faceted concept which includes relatively objective features such as 
variety, reliability and serviceability as well as more subjective factors such as user 
satisfaction. The quality of service in mobile communication is defined here (the objective 
aspect) by a number of key indicators. They include technical faults, network availability, 
call set up access rate and call drop rate. Some papers conclude that the reform is positively 
associated with the quality of services in mobile telephony. However, very few quality 
indicators are available on a cross-country basis for the mobile communication services.  
In our analysis and since such detailed information are very scarce, another feature of 
quality is considered, the “coverage”. Many observers assume that with the liberalization of 
the sector which results in an increase of the number of mobile operators, the percentage of 
the population covered will also grow, since competition will induce lower prices and more 
affordable service. However, some examples demonstrate that the reverse can be true10. One 
possible reason for this counter-intuitive finding is that many mobile operators focus on the 
more profitable urban areas and lack the resources and/or interest to roll service out to rural 
areas, where the majority of people reside and where the social benefits of mobile 
connectivity are higher than in well-served urban areas. Besides, as more operators enter the 
market and competition intensifies, the utilization levels and profitability of many carriers 
drop, hindering their ability to invest in the network to expand further. 
5.1.2 Telecommunications policy reform variables  
 Regulation Variables:  We used three dimensions of the regulation framework. First, we 
construct a dummy variable ‘NRA’ that denotes the establishment of an independent 
National Regulatory Authority in the sector. The variable NRA takes a value of 1 only if 
the authority is characterized autonomous and 0 otherwise. In order to take into account 
the dynamic effect of the regulatory framework, we include a count measure of the 
number of years since the establishment of an independent regulatory body, 
‘NRA_YEARS’. Moreover, Mobile Number Portability (MNP) is a regulatory facility 
which is likely to affect retail prices, termination charges, price elasticity’s, market shares, 
as well as entry and investment decisions. It is fair to say that most analyses on MNP have 
supported the notion that, on the whole, MNP intensifies competition in mobile 
telecommunications. The effect of MNP on the mobile sector performance has never been 
tested before. Thus, we include ‘MNP’ a dummy variable which takes 1 when number 
portability in mobile networks is established in a country and 0 otherwise.  
 Privatization Variables: The effect of change in ownership of the incumbent provider on 
performance is captured by a dummy variable ‘PRIV’ which equals 1 when the firm has 
allowed for the first time, private participation in its operations and 0 otherwise. A 
variable ‘State Ownership’ measures the percent of shares owned by the state. Besides, 
using a single point in time can only provide a limited impact of telecommunication 
reforms. Thus, besides a binary measure of whether or not a country has privatized the  
                                                                 
10 Despite the large number of operators (eight) in India, for example, population coverage lags 
significantly behind Jordan, with four operators; China, three operators; and the Philippines, three. 
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*) The data is available only until 2007. 
Table 1. Variables Definitions 
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mobile sector, we use a count measure of the number of years since privatization, 
‘PRIV_YEARS’. 
 Competition Variables:  To measure the degree of competition, we used a variables 
COMP, assigned a value of zero if the mobile telecommunications sector is served by a 
national monopoly operator, a value of one if the sector has two operators and a value 
of two if the sector has more than two operators in mobile market segment11 (Wei Li, 
2004). Besides, the market share of the new entrants captures competitive pressure in 
the mobile telephony market. The ‘New_entrants’ variable, which concern only mobile 
network operators, is the ratio of the number of mobile lines in operation owned by the 
new operator to the number of total mobile lines in the market. However, the mode of 
competition has changed on the European mobile markets during the last ten years. 
Emergence of virtual operators, together with new content providers, has brought a 
large number of new players to the market. The traditional market structure of 
incumbent operators and their vertically integrated partners was so fragmented. 
Furthermore, the amount of competitors has increased and new kinds of competitors 
emerged. Indeed, the fast developing regulatory framework in European countries 
force MNOs to accept virtual operators, however, not all countries have changed their 
regulation to promote competition. Thus, the introduction of mobile virtual operators 
could be an interesting variable never taken before. Thus variable ‘MVNO’ is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of one when the first virtual operator is launched in a 
country. We also added the variable ‘MVNO_YEARS’ which is a count variable 
representing the number of years since the launch of the first MNVO.  
5.1.3 Political and institutional variables 
The regulation quality is very important in assessing company performance (Henisz, 2002). 
Indeed, the narrower the regulatory regime, the greater the political involvement is likely to 
be in company management. More political involvement translates into a blurring of market 
based performance since politicians seek to satisfy national and special interest needs that 
go beyond the company’s “welfare.” Political interference is in this case is more costly to the 
privatized company. The effect of the magnitude of institutional endowments on firms’ 
performance is gauged by the variable ‘POLCON III’ developed by Henisz (2002). This 
variable ranges between 0-100. Smaller values illustrate an economy with lower economic 
freedom, narrower institutional endowments, and higher political risks.  
5.1.4 Country economic indicators  
Firms in small economies have traditionally been assumed to encounter substantial 
difficulties improving their performance. They are characterized inter alia, by limited 
capacity which prevents them to exploit high economies of scale. This is particularly true for 
firms in sectors with high fixed and sunk cost such as telecommunications. Symeou (2009) 
analysis of the liberalization of small and large European countries finds that competition as 
an end in itself is less relevant to the success of liberalization in small economies. This can be 
explained, on one level, by the fact that market dynamics in small economies limit the 
prospects for efficient entry. On other level, because the number of operators required 
                                                                 
11 S. Zheng & M.R. Ward (2010) used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as measure of competition 
intensity. Wallsten (2001) used the number of mobile operators. Instead, Barros and Seabra (1999) 
employed a dummy variable which drew a distinction between monopoly and non-monopoly markets. 
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generating the expected outcomes of liberalization efficiently is much smaller than in large 
economies.  We assume then, that there exist a relationship between economy size and firm 
performance. Thus, following Symeou (2004, 2009), an index for smallness suggested by 
Jalan (1982) is adopted which combines population, income and geographical measures. 
These indicators (GPD, population, arable area) are used to measure the country’s economy 
‘Size’ variable which is an index constructed as follow: 
 ܵ݅ݖ݁	ܫ݊݀݁ݔ = ଵ଴଴ଷ ቀ ௉೔௉೘ೌೣ + ஺೔஺೘ೌೣ + ௒೔௒೘ೌೣቁ  
Pi, Ai and Yi are population, arable area and GDP of each country respectively; 
Finally, “Small”, is a dummy variable which takes 1 if economy is small based on the size 
index’s median. 
5.2 Econometric analysis 
5.2.1 Panel model 
The approach taken in this study is to examine how indices of market efficiency such as 
network deployment, work productivity, prices and quality of services offered and 
employment have been effected by the introduction of competition, by the privatization of 
the traditional telecommunications organizations and by the establishment of independent 
regulatory authorities over both time and countries. 
To do so, our empirical analysis consists in the specification and estimation of equations for 
prices, subscriptions, output, quality, employment and labor productivity. In each of these 
equations we consider three main aspects of telecommunication reform-privatization, 
competition and regulatory development as explanatory variables.  
The current study employs the approach used by earlier studies. Each equation was 
estimated using two regression models: a random effects specification and a fixed effects 
specification. The fixed effect specification assumes that county-specific effects are fixed 
parameters to be estimated, whereas the random effect model assumes that countries 
constitute a random sample.  
The general model we refer to can be written as follow: 
 	 ௜ܻ௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚܴ௜௧ + ߜ ௜ܺ௧ + ߤݐ + ߝ௜௧ 												݅ = 1, … , ܰ					ݐ = 1,… , ܶ  
where Y is the set of variables used to proxy performance, i is an individual country, t is a 
period of time (1 year), ߙi the country fixed effect that controls for country specific 
propensity to reform and other country specific unobserved factors. Explanatory variables 
include a set of reform variables (Rit) and set of control variables (Xit). Time (t) is a time 
trend12 and is used to catch the temporal effect and reflects technological change and ߝ௜௧ is 
the error term.  
In order to account for dynamics in our data, we make use of the Differenced Generalized 
Method of Moments (DIF-GMM) developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) for analyzing 
panel data. However, fixed and random models systematically outperform these dynamic 
regressions13. 
                                                                 
12 We have also experimented with including time dummies instead of the time trend, and the results 
are very similar. For ease in checking the tendency of the time trend and reporting the results, we 
therefore use the time trend specification.  
13 These results, not reported in this study, are available from the authors. 
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Generally, studies of the impact of reforms on enterprise performance encounter difficult 
issues namely the endogeneity bias. Indeed, the biggest potential problem is that 
competition, privatization and regulation may be endogenous to reforms. That is, reforms 
affect telecom performance, but performance may also affect reforms. A possible source of 
endogeneity is that unobservable factors affecting reform may also affect performance, e.g., 
managerial quality, that are correlated with both the dependent variable and with the 
included explanatory variables. The analysis deals with this issue by including country fixed 
effects. This permits control for a country-specific propensity to reform. The reform dummy 
variables, too, help control for a pro-pensity to reform, which could be correlated with 
performance changes. 
5.2.2 Alternative specifications 
For each outcome variable, we estimate the baseline equation under two different 
specifications and report the results in tables 2-4.  
The two specifications tests for the whole performance measures are: 
1. Interaction between reform variables: Theory suggests that simply privatizing a monopoly 
may not generate telecom improvements. Careful regulation is required to encourage a 
monopoly to improve its performance. To explore further the effects of regulation, we 
interact the regulation dummy with the privatization dummy. Then, following Wei Li 
and Xu (2004), we added an interaction variable between privatization and competition 
in order to estimate complementarities that may exist between the two reforms and 
estimate model 2 (M2). M2 allows us to explore separately the effects of competition, 
privatization, regulation and how they interact. 
2. Small size versus Big economies: In order to analyze whether the effects of the reforms 
change with the economy’ size across countries, we rerun the baseline regressions 
allowing the reform effects to differ between big and small economies (those with Size 
index lower than the median value). We do so by including interaction terms between 
the small size dummy variable with the reform variables and estimate model 3 (M3). 
5.3 Regression results 
In this section, we address the existence of relationships between the reform variables-
privatization, completion and regulation- of the mobile communications services outcomes 
by running a set of regressions. Table A2 in the appendix show the fixed-effect and random-
effect estimation results on which we build our testing procedure asking whether the reform 
variables, have a significant impact on the variables of mobile communications outcomes, 
namely, ARPU, labor productivity, employment, coverage, output and mobile density. 
In addition to showing the estimated values of the parameters associated with the 
explanatory variables listed at the left, Tables 1-3 include three additional items. Firstly, we 
provide an F-statistic (F) for fixed-effects or Wald statistic (Wald) for random-effects for 
testing the joint significance of the explanatory variables. Secondly, we rely on the Hausman 
test while opting for random effects or fixed effects. Thirdly, we include the number of 
observations included in each regression (Obs.). 
The results in table 2, Wu-Hausman specification test to discriminate between fixed and 
random effect models show that in most cases a fixed effects model is the appropriate model 
specification. Recall that fixed-effect models allow controlling for fixed unobserved 
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heterogeneity and are therefore preferred to random models when estimating the 
relationship between privatization and telecommunications outcomes. Four of the six 
equations seem to present fixed effects. Only in ARPU and labor productivity regressions 
random effects seems more suitable.  
Tables 2-4 present the results of estimating the baseline equations besides estimates under 
the two alternative specifications explained above for each of the six dependent variables.  
1. Output and pricing: Did privatized companies restrict output and raise prices? (Li and 
Xu, 2004). Overall, the degree of market competition (proxied by the share of new 
entrants) and years after the establishment of MVNOs considered as new competitors 
(could also be interpreted as the effect of prospective competition according to 
Nicolletti, 2001) emerged as the main explanations for the cross-country and time 
variability in output. Estimates in table 2 show that privatization have a limited, 
negative and statistically insignificant, effect on output. It’s true that call volumes often 
rise with network penetration; however the number of players on the market also 
arises, shirking the output of each operator. This result is confirmed first, by the 
negative and significant impact of number portability (MNP) on output. Unfortunately, 
we do not have information about churn rates; however, MNP can be taken as proxy 
since customers who want to switch to another operator generally prefer to keep their 
primer phone number. Second, the negative and highly significant coefficient on the 
interaction variable Priv×Comp confirms once again the negative impact of both 
privatization and competition on output. This finding is totally different of those found 
in previous studies. Li and Xu (2004) find that full privatization has a positive impact on 
real output and no evidence of complimentarily between privatization and competition 
on output expansion. However, the authors consider their results as puzzling and 
explain them by the fact that their data are not adjusted for changes in service quality.  
Estimates in table 3 show that overall, Privatization and the regulation indicators 
performed quite well, significantly improving the fit of the regressions. The estimates 
broadly suggest that countries having stronger actual competition and more regulated 
market tend to have lower prices. These findings are quite similar to those of Nicoletti 
(2000). Interestingly, political constrains seems to have important, positive and 
statistically significant impact on firms’ ARPU. Finally, privatization seems to have 
larger and significant effects on firms’ ARPU in small size economies contrary to 
Competition. 
2. Employment: Table 3 presents estimates with employment in logarithm as dependant 
variable under the two specifications discussed above. Inspection of the results reveals 
that, consistent with the hypothesis, employment is reduced due to the privatization of 
traditional telecommunications organizations. The estimated effects of number of years 
since privatization are small but highly significant. Besides, employment decreased 
slightly but non-significantly with both actual and prospective competition 
(N_MVNOs). The greatest effect on employment stems from the new enterprises in the 
market where market structure is the main explanatory variable with small but positive 
and highly significant effect on employment. In column 2, estimates of the coefficient on 
the interaction variable between privatization and competition is negative, contrarily to 
regulation, the two coefficients are however small and statistically insignificant. Finally, 
competition seems to have larger effects on employment in small size economies 
contrary to privatization.  
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* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2. The Impact Of Privatization, Competition And Regulation On Arpu And Output 
Using Fixed Effects And Random Effects 
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3. Labor productivity:  Using labor productivity measured by real output per employee as 
the dependant variable, we estimate equation 1 under the alternative specifications and 
report the results in table 3. There we find that privatization increases labor 
productivity yet both statistically insignificant except under the second specification. 
This finding is ambiguous and difficult to explain since most of the previous studies 
confirm a positive and significant link between privatization and labor productivity. 
Only Nicoletti (2000) found a negative impact and explained that his result could 
depend on the limited concept adopted for privatization, which was defined as any 
initial sale of PTO shares, not necessarily implying loss of control by the state. However, 
these explanations could at best account for the lack of significance of this variable, 
certainly not a negative impact. We can adopt such explanation since our results suffer 
only from lack of significance. As found before for ARPU, privatization seems however 
to have large and significant effect in smaller economies contrarily to competition. 
4. Mobile density: Table 4 reports the estimates of equation 1 under the two other 
specifications with Mobile Density as dependant variable. Focus first on the impact of 
privatization on network expansion. Estimates on columns 1-3 show that moving to 
private ownership is positively associated with the expansion of mobile network. 
However, unlike most of the studies under review (Li and Xu, 2004), the estimates here 
are small and statistically insignificant except in column 2. In our opinion, this can be 
explained by the fact that, in the studies mentioned above; authors consider growth in 
the mobile density as an expansion of the service coverage. We do not agree with such 
definition, since coverage is a geographic indicator of the mobile network expansion 
while density is simply the number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants. This indicator 
does not reveal the contrasting tele-densities in saturated urban areas and rural areas 
and could be then inflated by the number of subscribers in large metropolitan areas. 
Indeed, generally, statistics do not take into account the inadequacies in mobile phone 
coverage in the more rural and remote zones. Moreover, even though competition has 
prompted the mobile companies to improve coverage by adding new base stations, they 
generally avoid investing in difficult and less populated areas because of low revenue 
users in these zones. Most high end users are in urban areas only. This lead to an 
improvement in mobile density but more in urban zones and less in white areas where 
coverage is essentially non-existent. For all these reasons we consider the effect of 
privatization on mobile density could be limited. Regarding competition, as mentioned 
earlier, the market structure has a small but positive and statistically significant effect 
on mobile density. More interestingly, the increasing number of mobile virtual 
operators has a negative and statistically significant effect on mobile density. This 
confirms our former explanation. Even though MVNOs may have little or no network 
infrastructure of their own, they can focus on low penetrated rural markets which are 
outside the focus of that MNO, but unfortunately, this is not the case yet. In column 2, 
estimates reveal that the joint effects of privatization and competition are small and 
statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, the joint effects between privatization and 
regulation have a negative effect on density. Finally, competition seems to have larger 
effects on mobile density in larger size economies however the estimate is statistically 
insignificant. Finally, a sound institutional endowment consisting of a strong telecom 
regulatory body and a stable political system increase the level of main lines per 100 
inhabitants. 
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* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 3. The Impact Of Privatization, Competition And Regulation On Employment And 
Labor Productivity Using Fixed Effects And Random Effects 
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* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 4. The Impact Of Privatization, Competition And Regulation On Teledensity And 
Coverage Using Fixed Effects And Random Effects 
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5. Coverage: To begin with, privatization has a negative and highly significant effect on 
coverage. This result seems surprising. However, as explained before, MNOs avoid 
investing in difficult and less populated areas because of low revenue users in these 
zones. This lead to an improvement in mobile coverage and density but more in urban 
zones and less in white areas where coverage is essentially non-existent. Additionally, 
the combined effects of a new regulatory environment and of privatization of the 
national telecommunications organization result in a more robust decline of the 
coverage. It’s important to note that, these findings can’t be compared with findings in 
previous studies on mobile telecommunications, since most of them do not consider this 
performance indicator. Only very few studies examine the correlation between quality 
and reform process on the mobile sector and characterize quality as the technical 
performance of the mobile networks. Other studies find that cellular coverage was 
largely developed in the decade since the privatization of mobile telecommunication 
services. Further, they conclude that formulation of a regulatory policy and the 
establishment of an independent regulatory body impact positively on the quality (Fink 
and Mattoo et al 2001, Galal and Nauriyal 1995). 
6. Conclusion 
This research studied three chief aspects of the process of telecommunications market 
reform. We analyzed the effects of privatization, competition and regulation on a 
comprehensive set of performances in the mobile telecommunications sector in 31 European 
countries during the period from 1993 to 2008. Using an econometric model, the results are 
quite mitigated since some of them are different of those from prior research. 
To preview, the results show that competition is associated with increased penetration, and 
lower prices while privatization by itself is associated with few benefits. Privatization 
combined with an independent regulator, have most a negative impact on performance 
indicators. Moreover, smaller size economies appear to experience similar reform impact as 
larger economies on output and coverage. However, the impact of competition on mobile 
phone density and employment seems to be higher in small economies and lower for labor 
productivity contrarily to the privatization effect. Furthermore, in small economies, MNOs, 
appear to achieve higher ARPU more if the sector is privatized but competition bring it 
down. Moreover, in contrast to competitive pressure, privatization reduces employment. 
The opposite effects that privatization and competition on employment is confirmed by the 
negative joint effect in the estimates. Further, privatization have no identifiable impact on 
output, this surprising result may be explained by the fact that most of the previous studies 
attribute robust growth in output to total factor productivity not considered in this analysis. 
More important, competition is found to raise output contrarily to labor productivity. 
Consistent with this result, competition and privatization exhibit strong opposite effects on 
output, and complementarily, yet insignificant, on labor productivity.  Similarly, we find 
that large portion of mobile network expansion can be attributed to both privatization and 
completion.  
We used historical average revenue per user (ARPU) as an indicator of user willingness to 
pay and as proxy to price. As expected, even though the number of subscribers exploded in 
the last decade in the European mobile telecommunications networks, the ARPU fell under 
both competition and regulation pressures. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Recent Developments in Mobile Communications – A Multidisciplinary Approach 26
Regarding quality, surprisingly, privatization seems to decrease network coverage. One 
possible reason for this counter-intuitive finding is that when competition intensifies, more 
operators enter the market, the utilization levels and profitability of many carriers drop, 
hindering their ability to invest in the network to expand further. Overall, even though new 
technological developments and the digitization of the technological infrastructure in 
particular, exert a very substantial effect on coverage, in some cases, the quality of services, 
despite the reforms of the sector, remains at the approximate level before the reform. 
Finally, a common finding is that higher quality of institutional endowments has globally a 
positive impact on firm efficiency which is confirmed by our results and concerns both small 
and large economies. Besides enhancing firm efficiency, higher quality of institutional 
endowments and lower political risk in the economy may also reduce the apparent riskiness 
of the economy in the global market. Higher quality institutional endowments may even 
overcome the regulation authority role. This reinforces the growing impression in the 
literature on telecommunications policy that generic competition law might be sufficient to 
maintain a healthy competitive environment and makes industry-specific regulation 
unnecessary, as long as strong institutional foundations and low political risk are in place 
(Symeou, 2004). 
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